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In an incomplete contract setting, we analyze the contracting out of
public service provision, comparing the performance of for-proﬁt and not-
for-proﬁt ﬁrms (NPs). Two institutional arrangements are considered, with
control rights lying either with the ﬁrm (’PPP’) or the government (’tra-
ditional procurement’). The use of an NP with traditional procurement
is found never to be the preferred option in terms of social welfare. But
for a range of parameter values an NP in a PPP is the preferred option.
The development of PPP provision has thus created opportunities for the
advantageous use of NPs in public services.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H41, L31, L33.
Keywords: contracting out, not-for-proﬁt ﬁrms, private ﬁnance initia-
tive, public-private partnership, incomplete contracts, public service provi-
sion.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent years have witnessed a steady stream of innovations in the way public
services are provided, particularly through the development of public-private part-
nerships (PPPs). In the UK, under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), it has
become common for the government to contract out the provision of public ser-
vices to a consortium of private ﬁrms that designs, ﬁnances, builds and manages
the facilities concerned (HM Treasury, 2006). In Canada, similar PPPs have been
used for major infrastructure projects, such as the 407 Express Toll Route to the
north of Toronto and the redevelopment of Pearson International Airport (Daniels
and Trebilcock, 2000), while in the US, in much of the European Union, and in
developing economies, there has been increasing use of such schemes (Linder and
Rosenau, 2000). Provision through PPPs contrasts sharply with the way pub-
lic services have traditionally been procured. Under traditional procurement, the
government speciﬁes the inputs and retains control rights over how the service is
delivered. Instead, under PFI-type PPPs, the government speciﬁes the output,
that is, it speciﬁes a basic service standard, but it is the ﬁrm that has control
rights over how to deliver the service.
Not-for-proﬁt ﬁrms (NPs) have long been established in public service provi-
sion, for example in health and education. However, there has recently been an
extensively-debated expansion in the role of NPs (see Weisbrod 1997, Bennett et
al., 2003, and IPPR 2003). An important recent example in the UK is the respon-
sibility for rail track facilities that the government has given to the NP, Network
2Rail. Among the other well-publicized cases are Glas Cymru, which was created
on a private initiative in April 2000 as a holding company for the assets of Dwr
Cymru, the Welsh water utility, and NAV Canada, which was established in 1996,
and owns and operates Canada’s civil air navigation service.
In this paper, we analyze the contracting out of service provision to private
ﬁrms, and we compare the case in which the contractor is an NP to that in which
it is a for-proﬁt ﬁrm (FP).1 We consider these cases under two diﬀerent institu-
tional arrangements. The ﬁrst is through a PPP, under which the private ﬁrm has
control rights over the project; the second is traditional procurement, the govern-
ment retaining control rights. We take an incomplete-contract approach (see, e.g.,
Hart, 1995), building on the seminal work on public service provision by Hart,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). We assume that the ﬁrm may make an observable
but unveriﬁable investment, researching innovative approaches to perform its task
in excess of the basic standard speciﬁed in the initial contract. An innovation,
if implemented, has an eﬀect both on the social beneﬁtt h a ti sg e n e r a t e db yt h e
production of the public service and on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Control rights (i.e., own-
ership of the project) give the power of veto over the implementation of any given
innovation. With a PPP, the ﬁrm’s control rights over the project give it the
power to implement an innovation without consulting the government (provided
basic standards are met), whereas with traditional procurement, the ﬁrm must get
the government’s agreement for implementation, and this involves bargaining.2
1This is a much revised version of Bennett and Iossa (2005).
2In the UK renegotiation does sometimes occur under PFI, for example when the contractors
reﬁnance a project. However, it is not in the spirit of PFI, which is speciﬁcally designed to
stimulate innovation by allowing contractors to keep the resulting ﬁnancial rewards (Audit Com-
3Whereas an FP may be assumed to maximize proﬁts, an NP operates under a
non-distribution constraint, which bans it from redistributing proﬁt to its mem-
bers. Also, an NP may be founded with a speciﬁc mission in mind, its users
and stakeholders may participate on its board of trustees, and there may be self-
selection of managers and workers with concern for this mission (see, e.g., Bilodeau
and Slivinski, 1996, and Besley and Ghatak, 2004). To capture these considera-
tions as simply as possible, we assume that the NP’s objective is to maximize
beneﬁts, though subject to a proﬁt constraint. Such a constraint is particularly
important for an NP because, given its non-distribution constraint, an NP does
not have the option of raising funds on the stock market. Indeed, because of this,
the NP is not subject to the market for corporate control, and this frees it to
pursue its mission objective.3
We compare the investment incentives of an FP and an NP under diﬀerent
institutional arrangements, noting the implications for diﬀerent types of public
services. Three alternative scenarios are considered. In the ﬁrst, implementation
of an investment increases both the contractor’s proﬁt and social beneﬁt( w er e f e r
to this as ‘proﬁtable quality improvement’). For example, the investment may be
mission, n.d.). According to the House of Commons (2003), 73% of UK construction projects
using traditional procurement had a ﬁnal price that exceeded that in the original contract, but
the corresponding ﬁgure for PFI was 22%, and most of these were the result of changes led by
the relevant government department, not by the contractor.
3In contrast, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) assume that NP status is chosen by a self-interested
entrepreneur as a commitment device, to reassure customers and other agents against ex post
expropriation (e.g. on non-contractible output quality). In their model the NP entrepreneur
pursues proﬁt (as well as output quality - for reputational reasons or out of altruism) to an
extent that is limited by the fact that, because of the non-distribution constraint, proﬁts can
only be used to buy perquisites. As a referee has pointed out, this ignores that NPs are generally
exempt from corporate income tax in the US, so that, if we were to accept the view that the
NP entrepreneur is self-interested, this could in principle imply that the NP would put a greater
weight on proﬁtt h a na nF Pd o e s .
4in asset quality (e.g., of a hospital or a school building) that generates both lower
maintenance costs for the contractor and greater social beneﬁt from the use of the
asset for public service provision (e.g., fewer disruptions to teaching or a better
healing environment). In contrast, the second and the third scenarios are charac-
terized by a conﬂict between social beneﬁt and proﬁt. In the second (‘unproﬁtable
quality improvement’) this occurs because implementation of an investment that
increases social beneﬁt is costly and, in the absence of a side-payment from the
government, will cut the contractor’s proﬁt. For example, implementation of the
investment might improve safety, but the original contract may not oﬀer scope to
raise revenue to cover the costs of implementation. In the third (‘cost cutting at
the expense of quality’) implementation of an investment increases proﬁt, but has
an adverse impact on social beneﬁt. For example, a cost-cutting innovation might
compromise safety.
We organize our results around the distinction between the eﬀect on bene-
ﬁts of implementing an innovation and the eﬀect on proﬁt of implementing the
innovation. We say that the beneﬁte ﬀect dominates if, per unit of investment,
implementation has a larger eﬀect (of either sign) on beneﬁtt h a nt h ee ﬀect (of
e i t h e rs i g n )t h a ti th a so np r o ﬁt. We focus on the case where the beneﬁte ﬀect
dominates, as this is the most relevant for public service provision.
Suppose that the budget constraint for the NP is such that an innovation can
be implemented only if it is proﬁtable. If the beneﬁte ﬀect dominates then we ﬁnd
that there is an optimal matching: FP provision with traditional procurement on
the one hand, and NP provision with PPP on the other. Welfare maximization
5requires that the eﬀect of investment on beneﬁt is taken into account. This can be
achieved by either NP provision, because an NP cares about beneﬁtd i r e c t l y ,o rb y
traditional procurement, because then control rights are held by the government
which also cares about beneﬁt. With NP provision under traditional procurement,
too much weight, in welfare terms, would be put on beneﬁts relative to proﬁts;
with FP provision under PPP too little relative weight would be put on beneﬁts.
If instead the proﬁte ﬀect dominates, FP provision is weakly preferred to NP
provision because an FP maximizes proﬁts and proﬁts give a relatively big payoﬀ
in welfare terms. If an NP budget constraint is less tight, the matching may break
down because the NP may overinvest. These general conclusions apply across all
three investment scenarios.
The above results suggest the introduction of PPP has increased the scope for
welfare-enhancing provision by an NP; but NP provision can only be preferable if
the beneﬁte ﬀect dominates.
The theoretical literature on the provision of public services is expanding
rapidly. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Schmitz (2000) compare public
provision with contracting out to an FP. The optimality of bundling building and
managing operations in PPP projects with FPs is discussed by Hart (2002) and
Bennett and Iossa (2006) under incomplete contracts, and by Bentz, Grout and
Halonen (2001) under complete contracts. Bundling in an incomplete-contract
model is also analyzed by Bös and De Fraja (2002), who examine the case of
health care for which quality is unveriﬁable. However, none of these papers con-
siders public service provision by NPs.
6There is also an extensive literature on NPs, though, for many years, its main
focus was on the relationship between the ﬁrm and its donors (see e.g. Rose-
Ackerman, 1996). However, a related branch of the literature considers NPs that
do not rely on donations (see Hansmann, 1986, 1996). Glaeser and Shleifer (2001)
model NP status as a device to maximize the returns of a self-interested entrepre-
neur producing a private good (see note 3 above), but closer to our work is that
of Besley and Ghatak (2001). In their model, as in ours, a critical role is played
by the service provider’s valuation of social beneﬁt. They show that control rights
should be left with the party that values services more highly, thus indicating a
role for ‘benevolent’ NPs. However, contrary to us, they do not explicitly consider
P P P-w h i c hi ss h o w ni no u ra n a l y s i st ow i d e nt h ep o t e n t i a lr o l ef o rN P si ne ﬀec-
tive public service provision, and they do not allow for the possibility that the NP
has a budget constraint.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and compares
the alternative institutional arrangements. Section 3 considers the eﬀects of chang-
ing assumptions. Section 4 gives concluding comments, with illustrations of the
relevance of our results to public service provision in practice.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a setting where, initially, the government and the ﬁrm agree a con-
t r a c tt h a ts p e c i ﬁes observable and veriﬁable basic standards for the provision of a
public service. However, before operations begin, the ﬁrm may make an observ-
able but unveriﬁable investment, which we denote by x ≥ 0, researching innovative
7approaches to performing its task in excess of the basic standard. The cost of this
investment in monetary terms is C(x),w h i c h ,f o rs i m p l i c i t y ,w es h a l la s s u m et o
be quadratic: C(x)=x2/2. The investment cannot be contracted upon ex ante,
for it is not possible to specify in advance the delivery of a speciﬁc innovation.
We assume that an innovation, if implemented, aﬀects both the proﬁta n dt h e
social beneﬁt generated by the provision of the public service. In our solutions,
innovation x is always implemented.
The social beneﬁt generated by the provision of the public service is
B(x)=B0 + βbx, b > 0 (1)
where B0 is a positive constant denoting veriﬁable basic standards and β is a shift
parameter whose value is either 1 or −1.I f β =1 , x increases social beneﬁt; if
β = −1, x decreases social beneﬁt.
Gross proﬁti sd e ﬁned to be
Π(x)=Π0 + γπx, π>0 (2)
where Π0 is the default proﬁtt h a tt h eﬁrm by satisfying basic standards with x =0 .
γ is a shift parameter whose value is either 1 or −1:i fγ =1 , x increases proﬁt;.
if γ = −1, x decreases proﬁt. We assume that B(x) and Π(x) are observable but
unveriﬁable.
Net proﬁt ˆ Π(x) is deﬁned also to include the investment cost C(x) and the
monetary transfer z that is received from the government should bargaining occur
in order to get the ﬁrm to institute the innovation x.T h u s ,
ˆ Π(x)=Π0 + γπx− C(x)+z.
8An FP chooses x to maximize net proﬁt ˆ Π(x).A n N P c h o o s e s x so as to




B(x) subject to Π0 + γπx− C(x)+z ≥ ¯ Π.( 3 )
¯ Π is a parameter which, for now, we assume equals Π0, implying that, if we disre-
gard the proﬁt Π0 that would be achieved by satisfying basic standards, any further
proﬁt γπx− C(x)+z (the proﬁt related to innovation) must be non-negative.
The government is assumed to maximize B(x)−z0−z,w h e r ez0 is the payment
it makes for satisfying basic standards; that is, it maximizes beneﬁts minus any
payments to the ﬁrm.4
We focus on the following three scenarios (examples of which are discussed in
Section 4):
(a) Proﬁtable quality improvement: implementation of innovation x raises both
social beneﬁta n dt h eﬁrm’s proﬁt( β = γ =1 ).
(b) Unproﬁtable quality improvement: implementation of innovation x raises
social beneﬁt but cuts the ﬁrm’s proﬁt( β =1 ,γ= −1).
(c) Cost cutting at the expense of quality: implementation of innovation x raises
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt but cuts social beneﬁt( β = −1,γ=1 ).
We compare two institutional arrangements: public-private partnership (PPP)
and traditional procurement. We assume that under PPP the ﬁrm has control
rights over the project, being free to implement the innovation without consult-
4We are assuming here that ‘the government’ is a government agency, such as a local govern-
ment or ministry, with its own objectives, rather than an abstract welfare-maximizing govern-
ment.
9ing the government. Under traditional procurement, however, the government has
control rights over the project, and if there are gains from implementing the in-
novation, bargaining between the ﬁrm and the government will take place. To
simplify we assume that with probability 1/2 the government makes a take-it or
leave-it oﬀer, while with probability 1/2 the ﬁrm makes a take-it or leave-it oﬀer.
As a benchmark, we specify the ﬁrst-best solution. Welfare W(x) is deﬁned to
be the sum of beneﬁts, gross proﬁts and (negatively) the investment cost; that is,
W(x)=B(x)+Π(x) − C(x).( 4 )
The ﬁrst-best investment x∗ maximizes W(x). We assume for now that b>π ,t h a t
is, the dominant eﬀect of an innovation is on beneﬁts, rather than gross proﬁts.
(The reverse of this inequality is considered in the next section.) x∗ is therefore
given, for the respective cases, by
(a) x
∗ = b + π;
(b) x
∗ = b − π;( 5 )
(c) x
∗ =0 .
In this setting, for each institutional arrangement, PPP and traditional pro-
curement, and for each type of ﬁrm, FP or NP, we compare investment levels, and
thus welfare levels. The timing of the game is as follows. In period 0 the govern-
ment sets the basic standards for service provision and speciﬁes the institutional
arrangement and type of ﬁrm: PPP or traditional procurement, and FP or NP.
Also, the chosen FP or NP agrees a contract with the government to provide at
10least the basic standards B0 for price z0.5 In period 1 the contractor (FP or NP)
undertakes investment x researching improved methods for performing its task in
excess of the basic standards. In period 2, the contractor implements the inno-
vation - without consulting the government if the contractor has control rights
(PPP), but after bargaining with the government if the government has control
rights (traditional procurement). In period 3 the service is provided.
2.1 PPP
We assume in this section that the ﬁrm has control rights over the project. We
consider what happens to investment ﬁrst when the ﬁr mi sF Pa n dt h e nw h e ni t
is NP.
When the ﬁrm is an FP it chooses x to maximize ˆ Π(x), as given by (2). Thus,
writing xF









In cases (a) and (c), with proﬁti n c r e a s i n gi nx, an interior solution obtains; and
in case (b), with proﬁts decreasing in x, the FP does not invest. In each case the
solution is diﬀerent to the ﬁrst-best because the FP does not take into account the
eﬀect of x on beneﬁts. In cases (a) and (b) xF
p <x ∗ since the FP does not take
into account the positive eﬀect of x on B;i nc a s e( c )xF
p >x ∗ since the FP does
5We do not consider how the contractor was chosen. On the diﬃculties of competitive bidding
schemes when NPs are involved, see Steinberg (1997).
11not take into account the negative eﬀect of x on beneﬁts.
Suppose now that the ﬁrm is an NP, maximizing B(x) subject to its budget
constraint. Denote its investment by x = xN
p . In case (a) both beneﬁts and gross
proﬁta r ei n c r e a s i n gi nx, and so the NP invests up to the point at which the
budget constraint is binding; that is, πxN
p − C(xN
p )=0 .T h u s ,
(a) x
N
p =2 π.( 7 )
In case (b), although x increases beneﬁts, it is unproﬁt a b l e ,w h i l ei nc a s e( c )x
decreases beneﬁts. Therefore the NP does not invest in either case:
(b,c) x
N
p =0 .( 8 )
Compared to the ﬁrst-best, it is seen that in case (a) there is underinvestment,
given that b>π .S i n c e B is increasing in x, the NP invests up to where the
budget constraint binds. Since π is low compared to b, the budget constraint
binds at a point from which welfare could have been raised by further increasing
x, but the budget constraint prevents the NP from doing so. In case (b) the ﬁrst-
best involves positive investment since b>π ; but the budget constraint prevents
any investment, and so there is underinvestment compared to the ﬁrst-best. In
case (c) xN
p = x∗ since both are zero.
These conclusions lead immediately to our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 For PPP with b>πand ¯ Π = Π0, the NP weakly dominates the
FP in welfare terms. In case (a) xF
p <x N
p <x ∗; there is underinvestment under
both arrangements, but investment and welfare is greater with an NP than with
12an FP. In case (b) xF
p = xN
p <x ∗; there is the same amount of underinvestment
under each arrangement. In case (c) xF
p >x N
p = x∗; the provision by the NP yields
the ﬁrst-best level of investment, but there is overinvestment by an FP.
With PPP the ﬁrm has control rights over service provision. If it is an FP,
being only concerned with proﬁt, the beneﬁte ﬀect is not taken into account. This
suggests that, when the beneﬁte ﬀect is high relative to the proﬁte ﬀect, provision
by an NP, which cares about beneﬁt, is preferable to provision by an FP. We shall
see however that this conclusion does not necessarily hold when the NP has a less
tight budget constraint.
2.2 Traditional Procurement
We now turn to traditional procurement, the government having control rights.
Then an innovation cannot be implemented without the government’s approval. If
there are positive gains from implementation, bargaining between the ﬁrm and the
government occurs.6 We assume that the outside option is zero for each player.
Hence, if bargaining occurs the default payoﬀ f o re a c hp l a y e ri st h ep a y o ﬀ that
would obtain if there were no implementation of x and only the basic standards
were achieved. Thus, respective the default payoﬀsa r eB0 − z0 ≡ V0 for the
government, Π0 for an FP and B0 for an NP.
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h eﬁrm is an FP. With bargaining, if the FP makes the
oﬀer, the best it can do is ask the government to pay the amount that makes the
6Thus, we follow Hart Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and assume that the control rights of the
government work as a commitment device for renegotiation to take place over how to share
the gains from implementation. Investment cost C(x) is a bygone but implementation of the
investment is not.
13government indiﬀerent between agreeing to the oﬀer or not; that is, the oﬀer the
FP makes is z = βbx. If the government makes the oﬀer, the best it can do is
ask the FP to pay the amount for which the FP is indiﬀerent between accepting
or not; that is, the government makes the oﬀer z = −γπx.7 Hence, given the
simple formulation of alternating-oﬀers bargaining, there is an equal chance that
ˆ Π(x)=Π0 + γπx− C(x)+βbx or ˆ Π(x)=Π0 + γπx− C(x) − γπx = Π0 − C(x).
Thus, E[ˆ Π(x)] = Π0 +
1
2(γπx + βbx) − C(x). We therefore have that in cases
(a) and (b) the FP will set dE[ˆ Π(x)]/dx = 1
2[γπ + βb] − x =0 .I n c a s e ( c )
E[ˆ Π(x)] = Π0 + 1
















Compared to the ﬁrst-best, there is underinvestment in cases (a) and (b). If
the FP makes the oﬀer, it asks the government to pay the value of beneﬁts from
implementation, which, if this oﬀer were going to be accepted, would cause the
FP to internalize beneﬁts fully and therefore the ﬁrst-best would be achieved.
However, if the government makes the oﬀe ri ta s k st h eF Pt op a yt h ea m o u n to f
proﬁts that result from implementation. If this oﬀer is accepted, the FP will not
earn these proﬁts, and therefore it will internalize neither the proﬁts nor the value
of beneﬁts. It is because there is a 50% chance that the government will make
the oﬀer that the FP’s investment is below the ﬁrst-best level. However, case (c)
7Recall that the cost C(x) has already been incurred here, so the government does not have
to take C(x) into account in its oﬀer.
14coincides with the ﬁrst-best solution.
Suppose, instead, that the ﬁrm is an NP. Then, as far as it can, it will exploit
its budget constraint to extract money from the government, which can then be
used to increase beneﬁts. With β =1 , that is, in cases (a) and (b), the maximum
it can extract is found by setting the government’s default payoﬀ V0 = B0 − z0
equal to B0 + bx − z0 − z;t h a ti s ,z = bx.T h u s , i f i t c h o o s e s x such that the
budget constraint binds at z = bx, the government will pay it this amount. It is
not relevant here which player makes the oﬀer, for there is only one value of z that
is acceptable to both players. Substituting z = bx into the NP’s budget constraint,
we have bx + γπx− x2/2=0 . Given also that in case (c) the NP will choose not
t oi n v e s t ,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :
(a) x
N
t =2 ( π + b);
(b) x
N




In cases (a) and (b) there is overinvestment relative the ﬁrst-best. The NP’s
budget constraint is satisﬁed where W(x)−B0−Π0 =0 . Assuming that W(x∗) > 0,
if we raise x above x∗ by a small enough amount, W(x) will still be positive, but
will fall in value. The solution given for cases (a) and (b) in (10) involves the
NP raising x so far above x∗ that W(x) falls to zero. Thus, x>x ∗.I nc a s e( c ) ,
however, xN
t equals the ﬁrst-best level.
Our second proposition brings these results together and also speciﬁes that
in cases (a) and (b), for which we have found underinvestment by an FP but
15overinvestment by an NP, welfare is higher with the FP.
Proposition 2 For traditional procurement with b>πand ¯ Π = Π0 the FP weakly
dominates the NP in welfare terms. In cases (a) and (b) xN
t >x ∗ >x F
t ,w i t h
w e l f a r eh i g h e rw i t ha nF Pt h a nw i t ha n dN P .I nc a s e( c )xN
t = x∗ = xF
t .
Proof. The rankings of xF
t , xN
t and x∗ follow from (9) and (10). Now consider
only (a) and (b). From (1), (2) and (4), W 0(x)=βb + γπ − x; and from (5),
W 0(x∗)=βb + γπ − x∗ =0 .S i n c e W 00(x) < 0, it follows that for any value of
x such that W 0(x) < 0 we have that x>x ∗,a n df o ra n yv a l u eo fx such that
W 0(x) > 0 we have that x<x ∗. Using Taylor expansions, given that W 000(x)=0 ,
we have W(x)=W(x∗)+W 0(x∗)(x−x∗)+W 00(x∗)(x−x∗)2/2.S i n c eW 0(x∗)=0
and W 00(x) < 0,i tf o l l o w st h a tf o rx = x1 and x = x2, W(x1) R W(x2) as
(x1 − x∗)2 Q (x2 − x∗)2;t h a ti s ,a s|x1 − x∗| Q |x2 − x∗|. From (5), (9) and

















¯,s ot h a tW(xF
t ) >W(xN

















¯,s ot h a tW(xF
t ) >W(xN
t ).
With traditional procurement, social beneﬁts are internalized to some extent by
the FP because it bargains with the government, although there is underprovision
compared to the ﬁrst-best. In contrast, an NP prioritizes beneﬁts and, as a result,
if it also bargains with the government, it overprovides relative to the ﬁrst-best.
We ﬁnd that the NP overprovides to such an extent that welfare is lower than with
an FP. We return to this result and its sensitivity to our assumptions in Section
3.
162.3 PPP versus Traditional Procurement
The above results can be used to give an overall comparison of the four arrange-
ments - with PPP or traditional procurement, and FP or NP provision. First,
however, it is informative to note brieﬂy whether with provision by a given type
of ﬁrm (FP or NP) PPP or traditional procurement is preferable.
Lemma 1 Assume that b>πand ¯ Π = Π0. (i) If provision is by an FP then
traditional procurement is preferred to PPP in all cases. (ii) If provision is by an
NP then PPP is weakly preferred; in cases (a) PPP is preferred, while in cases (b)
and (c) PPP and traditional procurement produce the same results.
Proof. These results follow immediately from the ﬁrst-order conditions except
for (ii) (a) and (b). Consider (ii)(a). Using the same approach as in the proof of
Proposition 2, since xN
p =2 π and xN




¯ = |π − b| = b−
π and
¯ ¯xN
t − x∗¯ ¯ = π+b.H e n c e ,
¯ ¯xN
p − x∗¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯xN





















¯,s ot h a tW(xN
p )=W(xN
t ).
From Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 1, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1 Assume that b>πand ¯ Π = Π0. There is a (weakly) optimal match:
FP provision with traditional procurement on the one hand, and NP provision with
PPP on the other.
A general conclusion to emerge from our analysis is that the introduction of
PPP into public service provision has given scope for the advantageous employ-
17ment of NPs. With traditional procurement NP provision is always weakly domi-
nated by FP provision, whereas with PPP, NP provision is the (weakly) preferred
arrangement. In our framework there are two ways to ensure that the eﬀect of
investment on beneﬁt si st a k e ni n t oa c c o u n t .O n ei sp r o v i s i o nb ya nN P( b e c a u s e
of its objective of beneﬁt maximization) and the other is through traditional pro-
curement (since control rights are then with the government, and it cares about
beneﬁts). However, when the beneﬁte ﬀect of investment dominates the proﬁte f -
fect, if we have both an NP and traditional procurement, then the eﬀect on beneﬁts
may be taken into account excessively. Social welfare is higher if either an NP or
traditional procurement is used (but not both).
Our third proposition speciﬁes which of the two options, FP with traditional
procurement or NP with PPP, yields the greater welfare.
Proposition 3 Assume that b>πand ¯ Π = Π0. In case (a) the preferred arrange-
ment is an NP with PPP if b<3π, but it is an FP with traditional procurement
if b>3π. In cases (b) and (c) the weakly preferred arrangement is an FP with
traditional procurement.
Proof. Case (a). From Propositions 1 and 2, either an NP with PPP, or an FP

















¯ as b R 3π.T h u s ,
W(xN
t ) Q W(xF
p ) as b R 3π. Cases (b) and (c) follow from Propositions 1 and 2
and Lemma 1.
Consider case (a), where investment is in proﬁtable quality improvement. With
both an NP under PPP and an FP under traditional procurement there is underin-
18vestment. However, for given b, a higher level of π increases the investment of the
NP more than that of the FP. The reason is that the FP must share the additional
proﬁt with the government through the bargain, whilst the NP will use the entire
additional proﬁtt oﬁnance more investment.
In case (b), where investment is in unproﬁtable quality improvement, the NP
does not have the funds to invest under PPP. With traditional procurement the
government’s control rights work as a commitment device to share the beneﬁt
eﬀect with the FP, through bargaining, i.e. the government provides funding for
unproﬁtable investment. Thus, there is some investment (though less than the
ﬁrst best) and welfare is higher than with an NP under PPP.8
In case (c), each arrangement yields zero investment, as in the ﬁrst best.
3 Alternative Assumptions
In this section we examine the eﬀects of dropping the assumptions that b>πand
¯ Π = Π0.
3.1 b ≤ π
Suppose that b ≤ π; that is, assume that the dominant eﬀect of an innovation is
on gross proﬁts, rather than beneﬁts. (The assumption that ¯ Π = Π0 is retained.)
Then a repeat of our earlier analysis gives the values of x in shown Table 1.
Compared to our results for b>π , the values in the table only change for cases
8This conclusion would unaﬀected. If we were to relax the assumption that there is no bar-
gaining under PPP. Bargaining with an NP under PPP would yield the same level of investment
as bargaining with an NP under traditional procurement. But we have already seen that welfare
is weakly higher with an FP under traditional procurement than with an NP.
19(b) and (c). However, the implications of the values in the table aﬀect the welfare
comparisons in all three cases. In contrast to when π>b ,t h eﬁrst-best solution in
case (b) is now zero investment because each unit of investment would cut gross
proﬁt by more than it would raise beneﬁt; but the ﬁrst-best now involves a positive
investment in case (c) because each unit of investment raises gross proﬁtb ym o r e
than it cuts beneﬁt. In case (b) each of the four arrangements now leads to the
ﬁrst-best solution, so we focus on cases (a) and (c), highlighting the diﬀerences






(a) b + π π 2π (b + π)/2 2(b + π)
(b) 0 0 0 0 0
(c) π − b π 0 (π − b)/2 0
Table 1. Levels of x when b ≤ π and ¯ Π = Π0
Consider PPP ﬁrst. In each case, the ﬁrst-order conditions for both FP and
NP provision are the same as when b>π . However, in case (a), with b ≤ π both
FP and NP lead to overinvestment, and so, since xN
p >x F
p , welfare is higher with
the FP.9 In case (c), with b ≤ π it is found that W(xF
p ) R W(xN
p ) as π R 2b.10
Turning to traditional procurement, since in case (a) π and b play symmetric
roles in the the formulae for x, the analysis is identical to that in the previous
section: xN
t >x ∗ >x F
t , with welfare higher with an FP than an NP. In case (c)
there was no investment when b>π , but with b ≤ π there is a positive surplus
9¯ ¯xF
p − x∗¯ ¯ = b and
¯ ¯xN
p − x∗¯ ¯ =( b+π)/2.S i n c eb ≤ π,w eh a v et h a t
¯ ¯xF




p ) ≥ W(xN
p ).
10¯ ¯xF
p − x∗¯ ¯ = b and
¯ ¯xN
p − x∗¯ ¯ = π − b. The welfare ranking in the text follows.
20from the bargain between the FP and the government for implementation of the
innovation. Because the FP must share the surplus with the government it invests
less than the ﬁrst-best amount; but this contrasts with the behaviour of an NP
which, because beneﬁts would fall, does not invest at all; that is for x∗ >x F
t >x N
t ,
w i t hw e l f a r ei sh i g h e rw i t ha nF Pt h a na nN P .
I fp r o v i s i o ni sb ya nF P ,t h e ni nc a s e( a ) ,f o rb o t hP P Pa n dt r a d i t i o n a lp r o -
curement, there will be underprovision relative to the ﬁrst-best, but we now ﬁnd
that PPP is preferred to traditional procurement. In case (c) it is found that
W(xF
p ) R W(xF
t ) as π R 3b;11 that is, if the proﬁt-eﬀect of investment substan-
tially outweighs the beneﬁt-eﬀect, PPP with an FP is preferred to traditional
procurement with an FP. Alternatively, if provision is to be by an NP then, in
case (a), there is overinvestment, more so under traditional procurement, so PPP
is preferred. In case (c), however, neither PPP nor traditional procurement results
in any investment.
The overall implications for the choice between the four arrangements are sum-
marized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 For b ≤ π and ¯ Π = Π0 the FP weakly dominates the NP in
welfare terms. In case (a) welfare is highest with an FP under PPP. In case (b)
all arrangements yield the ﬁrst-best. In case (c), if π>3b welfare is highest with
an FP under PPP, while if π<3b welfare is highest with an FP under traditional
procurement.
11¯ ¯xF
p − x∗¯ ¯ = b and
¯ ¯xF
t − x∗¯ ¯ =( π−b)/2.T h e r e f o r e
¯ ¯xF
p − x∗¯ ¯−
¯ ¯xF
t − x∗¯ ¯ =( 3 b−π)/2,a n d
the condition in the text follows.
21As i g n i ﬁcant feature to emerge from Propositions 3 and 4 is that, while PPP has
opened up new opportunities for welfare-enhancing public service provision NPs,
NP provision can only be strictly preferred if b>π . A second general conclusion
is that, across all our cases, for b>πor b ≤ π, traditional procurement with an
NP is always at least weakly dominated by other arrangements.
3.2 ¯ Π 6= Π0
We have assumed until now that the research into innovation and the subsequent
implementation cannot be a net cost to the NP; that is, the amount of proﬁt
from fulﬁlling the basic standards must be at least achieved by innovation and
implementation. Suppose, however, that the NP may be willing to forgo all of
Π0 to increase beneﬁt s ,w h e r e ,b ya s s u m p t i o n ,Π0 ≥ 0.T h u s , w e h a v e¯ Π =0in
(3).12 For brevity, we refer to this case as entailing a ‘less tight’ budget constraint
- compared to the case analyzed in Section 3.
Assume ﬁrst that b>πand consider PPP. In case (a) the NP now invests up
to the point at which πxN
p − (xN




p = π +( π
2 +2 Π0)
1/2. (11)
Hence, under PPP, having the less tight budget constraint causes the NP to in-
vest more. In case (b), x increases beneﬁts, and although it is unproﬁtable, the
availability of the amount Π0 to spend enables the NP to invest. In this case
12Other levels of constraint might also occur. For example, the NP might have other urgent
calls on its funds, so that, net, it must accumulate some proﬁt. Alternatively, it may be willing
to forgo some, but not all, of Π0.W ef o c u so nt h es p e c i ﬁc constraint in the text for simplicity,
but the eﬀects of other levels of the constraint may be inferred from our results.
22−πxN
p − (xN
p )2/2=−Π0. Again taking the real root,
(b) x
N
p = −π +( π
2 +2 Π0)
1/2. (12)
As in case (a), in case (b) the less tight budget constraint results in greater in-
vestment. In case (c), however, since investment reduces beneﬁt, the NP sets
xN
p =0 .
With traditional procurement, in cases (a) and (b) the NP’s budget constraint
binds with z = bx; but now this entails bx + γπx− x2/2=−Π0.T h u sw eo b t a i n






t = b + π +[ ( b + π)
2 +2 Π0]
1/2 > 2(b + π);
(b) x
N
t = b − π +[ ( b − π)
2 +2 Π0]
1/2 > 2(b − π).
In case (c) the NP will choose not to invest.
These results give our next lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume that b>πand that the NP aims to break even overall (a ‘less
tight budget constraint’). (i) In cases (a) and (b) under both PPP and traditional
procurement the NP will invest more with the less tight budget constraint. (ii) In
case (a), for b<3π,i f Π0 is not too large, then having a less tight budget constraint
increases the extent to which the NP under PPP yields greater welfare than other
arrangements do; but, for increases in Π0 above (b2 − π2)/2, dW(xN
p )/dΠ0 < 0,
and if Π0 becomes large enough, W(xF
t ) >W (xN
p ).I fb>3π, W(xF
t ) >W (xN
p )
23for all Π0 ≥ 0. (iii) In cases (b) and (c), having a less tight budget constraint has
no implications for which arrangement yields the highest welfare.
Proof. (i) This follows from comparison of (11) with (7), and (12) with (8). (ii)
b<3π is the condition for which xN
p is the best arrangement in Proposition 3. From
(5) and (11), xN
p = x∗ if Π0 =( b2−π2)/2.Al a r g e rΠ0 than this raises xN
p above x∗,
and eventually W(xN
p ) becomes smaller than W(xF
t ).I fb>3π, we already have
that W(xF
t ) >W(xN
p ) for Π0 =0 ;ah i g h e rv a l u eo fΠ0 strengthens this inequality.
(iii) In case (b), if Π0 =0 , xN
p >x ∗ and an NP under traditional procurement is
not the preferred arrangement. Since dxN
p /dΠ0 > 0, dW(xN
p )/dΠ0 < 0,s ot h a t
this arrangement is still not preferred. In case (c) since xN
p =0for all Π0 ≥ 0,
dw(xN
p )/dΠ0 =0 .
With b>π ,s i n c edxN
p /dΠ0 > 0, the existence of a less tight budget constraint
can have a positive eﬀect on welfare if xN
p <x ∗ when (as in Section 3) the budget
constraint is tight. However, a suﬃciently large value of Π0 can have a negative
eﬀect on welfare by causing excessive investment by the NP under PPP.
If, instead, b ≤ π, no changes are required to our conclusions in the previous
sub-section about which form of provision yields the greatest welfare.
4C o n c l u d i n g C o m m e n t s
In this paper we have analyzed contracting out to a not-for-proﬁt ﬁrm and to a
for-proﬁt ﬁrm under two alternative procurement arrangements. The ﬁrst is PPP,
whereby the ﬁrm is allocated control rights over how to deliver the service; the
second is traditional procurement, whereby the government retains control rights.
24Our main conclusion is that the development of PPP provision for public services
has increased the scope for welfare-enhancing not-for-proﬁtp r o v i s i o n ;t h a ti s ,f o r
some ranges of parameter values, the preferred administrative arrangement is PPP
with a not-for-proﬁt ﬁrm, even though, if traditional procurement were used, it
would be preferable to use a for-proﬁt ﬁrm. In the light of our results, we end by
discussing some examples, applying our results to highlight circumstances where
one institutional arrangement is preferable to another.
Consider ﬁrst case (a), where potential investments are in proﬁtable quality
improvement. In practice, investment in building quality can raise both social
beneﬁt and reduce maintenance costs. For example, better school buildings with
less frequent need for repairs also lead to fewer disruptions and help to create a
good learning environment; and higher-quality hospital buildings reduce disrup-
tions and generate a better healing environment. The proﬁtable quality improve-
ment scenario may also apply for free-standing projects, such as leisure centres
and nursing homes, where users are charged a fee and where there is competition
among providers, so that a higher quality of service may well raise total revenues
and proﬁts. Construction of roads is another example where investment can raise
both proﬁt and beneﬁt. In all these cases, our results suggest that the use of PPP
is desirable. If the eﬀect of investment on maintenance cost is relatively small
(b>π ), NP provision will be preferred provided the NP’s budget is tight enough;
but if the eﬀect of investment on maintenance cost is relatively large (b ≤ π),F P
provision is preferable.
Case (b) relates to investment in unproﬁtable quality improvement. For ex-
25ample, investment in building quality that raises social beneﬁt can also result in
lower proﬁt because a better design may be expensive to implement and maintain.
Furthermore, many public services are characterized by an inelastic demand and
are oﬀered in conditions of limited competition among the private providers. If
also the government is the purchaser of the service or if user fees are speciﬁed
in advance, increasing some unveriﬁable quality aspect of the service is likely to
be unproﬁtable for the contractor. In these circumstances our analysis indicates
that the weakly welfare-maximizing arrangement is traditional procurement with
an FP. In this context, it is interesting to note that the NHS Confederation in the
UK recently reported that PPP hospitals designed and built by FPs often failed
to create a good healing environment with less noise and more daylight.13
Finally, in case (c) investment is in cost cutting at the expense of quality. This
may be in the form of reduced safety, for example in railway maintenance or air
traﬃc control, but may relate to any quality aspect of the service (e.g. quality of
health care). In this case our analysis indicates that the preferred arrangement
for provision is highly sensitive to parameter values. If, however, the ﬁrst-best
solution is to have no such investments, then provision by an NP, either through
PPP or traditional procurement, is the weakly preferred arrangement.
In the UK the healthcare system is changing fast, and signiﬁcant parts of
provision are being put in private hands. If there is concern that provision by
FPs will lead to lower welfare through cost cutting at the expense of quality, this
concern may be alleviated by reliance on NPs. If we broaden our analysis to allow
13See PublicPrivateFinance, 85, July/August 2004.
26for the possibility that ﬁrms may have more than one option as to which kind of
investment they make, investment in quality improvement also being feasible, then
the broad indication of our analysis is that, with provision by an NP, PPP may
be preferable to traditional procurement.
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